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Abstract 
  
This paper relaxes the assumption of homogeneous skills among graduate workers and 
proposes a new approach to differentiate between real and apparent overeducation based on the 
level of cognitive skills actually achieved by the individuals. This proposal is applied to the 
study of the wage effects of overeducation in the Spanish labor market using data from PIAAC. 
The results suggest that between a quarter and a half of the graduate workers who appear to be 
overeducated in the Spanish labor market could be considered as being only apparently 
overeducated since they show a lower level of skills than that corresponding to their 
educational level or, alternatively, a level of cognitive skills which is commensurate with their 
job. Different returns are found for each group of overeducated individuals both when 
compared with adequately educated peers within a similar level of education (with greater wage 
penalties for apparently overeducated workers) and when the comparison is done with well-
matched co-workers doing a similar job (with a wage premium for real overeducation but no 
significant returns for apparently overeducated workers). These results point to the need of 
taking account of skills heterogeneity within an educational level when returns to overeducation 
are analyzed.  
  
Key words: educational mismatch; skills heterogeneity; real and apparent overeducation. 
  
1. Introduction 
In the last decades, a lot of work on the wage effects of overeducation has been carried 
out. The empirical evidence suggests that, within a job, overeducated workers tend to 
receive a wage premium as compared with their properly educated co-workers, although 
the returns to years of overeducation are lower than those of the education which is 
actually required for doing their job. On the other hand, when the comparison is made 
not within a job, but within educational levels, the empirical results point to 
overeducated workers suffering a wage penalty relative to workers who, with the same 
educational level, are properly educated for the job they do
1
.  
Most of this literature implicitly assumes skills homogeneity among workers within a 
similar educational level. Hence, when human capital is proxied by attained levels of 
education, or by years of schooling, it is assumed that individuals within an educational 
level achieve similar levels of skills. Similarly, when looking at educational mismatch, 
the educational level of the individual is compared with the requirements of the job, 
thus assuming that education reflects the skills needed to perform a job. However, there 
is an increasing dissatisfaction with this hypothesis since workers with similar levels of 
education might show different levels of skills.  
The idea of skills’ heterogeneity among workers within a similar level of education has 
recently led to three main lines of research which aim to address this hypothesis. The 
first one differentiates between educational and skill mismatches, showing that 
educational mismatch weakly correlates with skill mismatch (Allen and Van der Velden 
2001, Di Pietro and Urwin 2006, Green and McIntosh 2007). The second one uses panel 
data techniques to control for unobserved heterogeneity (Bauer 2002, Frenette 2004, 
Lindley and McIntosh 2009). And the last one aims to redefine the idea of 
overeducation in order to distinguish between real (or genuine) and apparent (or formal) 
overeducation
2
 (Chevalier 2003, Chevalier and Lindley 2009, Green and Zhu 2010, 
Pecoraro 2014). 
                                                          
1
 See Hartog and Oosterbeck (1988) for Holland; Verdugo and Verdugo (1989) for the United States; 
Dolton and Vignoles (2000) for the United Kingdom; Cohn and Ng (2000) for Hong Kong; or Murillo et 
al. (2012) for Spain. Extensive reviews on the effects of educational mismatch can be found in Hartog 
(2000) and Leuven and Oosterbeek (2011). 
2
 Whereas Chevalier (2003) distinguishes between ‘genuine’ and ‘apparent’ overeducation, other authors 
such as Green and Zhu (2010) prefer the terms ‘real’ and ‘formal’ overeducation. Without going deep into 
This work aims to contribute to this literature with a new proposal to differentiate 
between real and apparent overeducation based on the level of skills actually achieved 
by overeducated individuals. The idea of skills’ heterogeneity involves that some 
individuals with a higher educational level than that required for their job could in fact 
show a lower level of skills which actually corresponds to their job’s requirements. 
These overeducated workers could therefore be classified as being only formal or 
apparently overeducated. Conversely, those overeducated workers who have a level of 
skills which corresponds to their educational level, that is, a higher level of skills than 
that required for their job, would be classified as genuine overeducated workers. 
Following this idea, some previous studies differentiate between real and apparent 
overeducation basing on the individuals’ satisfaction with the match between their 
educational level and their job (Chevalier 2003, Chevalier and Lindley 2009) or, 
alternatively, basing on individuals’ self-declared measures of skills mismatch (Green 
and Zhu 2010, Pecoraro 2014). Both approaches are similar since the satisfaction 
declared by the individuals with their education-job match could be seen as a proxy of 
perceived skill mismatch. Under these approaches, overeducated workers who are 
satisfied with the match between their level of education and the job they hold, or who 
declare that their skills match the requirements of their jobs, are classified as apparently 
overeducated workers. On the contrary, those overeducated workers who are not 
satisfied with the match between their education and the job held, or who declare to 
suffer a mismatch in skills, are considered as being real or genuine overeducated. While 
these definitions have the advantage of taking the hypothesis of skills heterogeneity into 
account, they do not consider the skills actually acquired by the individuals in a straight 
way, but rather approximate them through individuals’ subjective assessments of skill 
mismatch.  
In this work, we propose an alternative approach to define real and apparent 
overeducation based on the objective level of cognitive skills achieved by the 
individuals. In order to test the hypothesis of skills heterogeneity among graduate 
workers, this proposal is then applied to the analysis of the wage effects of 
overeducation in the Spanish labor market. To this end, we use the PIAAC database, 
which offers information on the level of cognitive skills acquired by the individuals. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
a terminological discussion, in this work we will refer to genuine or real (and apparent or formal) 
overeducation indistinctly. 
Since only individuals with a higher education degree are considered, workers in our 
sample would be either adequately educated for their job or overeducated. Among the 
overeducated, we then distinguish between real and apparently overeducated workers 
according to their level of cognitive skills and analyze the wage effects associated to 
each group in order to test whether skills heterogeneity among graduate workers 
translates into different returns. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the conceptual 
framework of the approach proposed to distinguish between real and apparent 
overeducation and discusses its expected effects on wages. Section 3 presents the 
PIAAC database and the variables used in this study. Section 4 offers the results of the 
empirical analysis on the effects of (real and apparent) overeducation on wages. Finally, 
the paper closes with a section where the main conclusions of the study are discussed. 
 
2. Conceptual framework: Overeducation, skills heterogeneity and wages  
Assuming skills homogeneity when analyzing the effects of overeducation may lead to 
misleading results since workers with similar levels of education may show very 
different levels of skills. It is usually considered that overeducation exists when an 
individual has attained a higher educational level than that which is required to perform 
his/her job, so overeducation is associated with an excess of education in regard to the 
job an individual hold. However, if skills acquired by individuals vary within an 
educational level, this excess of education does not necessarily translate into an excess 
of skills. So, as pointed by Chevalier (2003), overeducation might come from the lack 
of skills of graduates. 
Considering only individuals with a level of higher education, we would find that most 
of the graduate workers with a high level of skills obtain a graduate job, thus being 
classified as adequately educated workers. Other graduate workers, however, will hold 
undergraduate jobs and would therefore be classified as overeducated since their 
educational attainment exceeds the requirements of their job. Among these 
overeducated workers we could still find individuals with a high level of skills, who 
could be considered as genuinely overeducated, and other less skilled workers who 
could be seen as only formal or apparently overeducated given that their skills do in fact 
correspond to the requirements of the undergraduate job that they hold. The extent of 
overeducation would therefore be overestimated if one assumes that there exists skills 
homogeneity among graduate workers, with part of the overeducated workers being 
only apparently overeducated given their lower endowments of skills.  
What are the wage effects of overeducation? Two main approaches have been followed 
in the empirical literature to answer this question. The specification proposed by 
Verdugo and Verdugo (1989) extends the mincerian wage equation introducing 
dummies for over- and under-education. This specification controls for attained 
education, so over- and under-educated workers are compared with workers who 
achieved a similar level of education but who are adequately educated. On the other 
hand, Duncan and Hoffman (1981) decompose attained education into years of over-, 
required-, and under-education (ORU specification). Specifications based on the ORU 
approach control hence for required education, so over- and under-educated workers are 
compared with adequately educated workers doing a similar job.  
Let’s restrict these specifications to the specific case of overeducation. When one 
controls for attained education, the effects of overeducation on individuals’ wages can 
be estimated by an equation of the following form: 
 ln(wi) = OOi +SSi +i +i
2 
+X + ui 
where ln(wi) is the natural logarithm of the hourly wage, O is a dummy variable for 
overeducated individuals, S is a variable measuring years of attained schooling, E refers 
to work experience and X is a vector of control variables. 
Equation 1 adopts the viewpoint of the individual’s educational level in the sense that 
overeducated workers are compared with adequately educated workers within a similar 
level of education. From a human capital perspective, workers are rewarded according 
to their productivity so the job’s requirements would not affect wages. In that case, 
overeducated workers would receive similar returns to education as their peers with a 
similar educational level who are adequately educated; that is, ceteris paribus, O would 
be equal to zero (O=0). A different view of the wage determination process in the labor 
market emphasizes the role of the job’s requirements, assuming that only job 
characteristics (or both jobs’ and individuals’ characteristics) determine wages. If this is 
the case, overeducated workers would suffer a wage penalty as compared to adequately 
educated workers with a similar educational level since, by definition, overeducated 
individuals hold jobs with lower educational requirements than their adequately 
educated peers do; in this case, O would be negative (O<0). 
The empirical results clearly point to overeducated workers earning less than their peers 
who, with a similar level of education, are adequately educated for the job they do. Two 
main explanations have been offered for this result, suggesting either that overeducated 
workers underutilize their skills or that they actually possess lower skills. The first 
explanation lies in the framework of the Assignment theory (Sattinger, 1993), which 
assumes that productivity, and hence wages, are determined by both individuals’ and 
jobs’ characteristics. In this context, not only attained education but also the use of the 
acquired skills in their jobs determines workers’ pay. Overeducated workers are 
consequently prevented from using part of their skills since they do lower level jobs 
which act as a limiting factor to their productivity, hence the pay penalty they suffer as 
compared with their peers holding a job that match their educational level. On the other 
hand, the second explanation assumes that overeducated workers are in fact less able or 
possess lower skills than their adequately matched peers, being therefore less productive 
and receiving a lower pay. This view rests on the hypothesis of heterogeneous skills 
among individuals within a similar educational level. Despite achieving a similar level 
of education, individuals may acquire different skills for several reasons (e.g. innate 
abilities, socio-economic context, quality of schooling…) and those reaching higher 
skills would be more likely to end up in a job that match their qualification whereas 
individuals with lower levels of skills would be prone to being overeducated. Under this 
hypothesis the lower pay of the overeducated workers would come from being less 
skilled than their adequately educated peers. Furthermore, since overeducated workers 
might lack the skills required to do a job that match their educational level, or 
alternatively they could be seen as holding a lower level job that match their lower 
skills, they could be thought as being only apparently overeducated. 
Some recent works have extended equation (1) to take account of possible heterogeneity 
among overeducated workers, breaking down the overeducation variable into two 
categories in order to distinguish between real and apparently overeducated workers. 
This alternative can be expressed as follows: 
 ln (wi) = ROROi  + AOAOi +SSi +i +i
2 
+X + ui 
where RO is a dummy variable for individuals who are real or genuinely overeducated 
whereas AO is a dummy for apparently overeducated workers. If the hypothesis of skills 
heterogeneity holds, one would expect to find different pay penalties for real and 
apparently overeducated workers. In this case, genuine and apparently overeducated 
workers are compared with adequately educated workers with a similar level of 
education. In regard to real overeducated workers, defined as highly skilled workers 
holding a job with lower requirements, one would expect that the pay penalty falls or 
vanishes. Real overeducated workers will show similar levels of skills than their peers 
who are properly matched, so according to the human capital theory, no wage difference 
will be observed (RO=0). It could be the case, however, that the lower characteristics of 
their jobs limit the productivity of these high skilled workers, who will then suffer a pay 
penalty (RO<0). As apparently overeducated workers, as defined above, have lower 
levels of skills than their adequately educated peers they are expected to suffer a pay 
penalty coming from both their lower skills and the lower job’s characteristics (AO<0). 
In any case, when comparing real and apparently overeducated workers, the wage 
penalty of apparently overeducated workers is expected to be greater, given their lower 
level of skills, than that of the genuine overeducated (AO<RO)
 3
. 
Following a different approach, a firm perspective is adopted when one controls for the 
education required to get a job. The equivalent to equation 1 would be given by: 
 ln(wi) = OOi +RRi +i +i
2 
+X + ui 
where years of attained schooling (S in equation 1) are replaced by years of required 
education (R in equation 3). When the job’s requirements view is adopted, overeducated 
workers are compared with well-matched workers doing a similar job. Once again, 
different results will be expected depending on the view of the wage determination 
process. If only job’s characteristics are assumed to determine wages one would expect 
that overeducated workers earn a similar wage than their appropriately matched 
colleagues doing a similar job; that is, O=0. However, if the individuals’ characteristics 
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 Previous works testing the hypothesis of heterogeneity among overeducated workers use a similar 
specification to that of equation (2). However, their definition of the variables of genuine and apparent 
overeducation bases on self-declared measures of skills (mis)match, either in a direct way (Green and Zhu 
2010, Pecoraro 2014) or indirectly through the satisfaction with the education-job match (Chevalier 
2003). Since their definition of the variables of interest differs from that followed in this paper, the 
interpretation of the results might clearly vary. This point will be further addressed when discussing the 
results in the last section. 
also have a role in determining earnings, overeducated workers would be expected to 
receive a greater wage than their lees educated co-workers who are properly matched, 
so O will be positive (O>0). 
The empirical literature generally supports this last view since overeducated workers 
seem to receive a wage premium when compared to properly matched workers within a 
similar job. What would happen if we consider that overeducated workers are 
heterogeneous in skills? Similarly to equation (2), the overeducation variable could be 
decomposed into two variables: real (RO) and apparent overeducation (AO).  
 ln (wi) = ROROi  + AOAOi +RRi +i +i
2 
+X + ui 
At first, the wage premium of the overeducated workers would be expected to come 
from their higher skills. Thus, if genuine and apparently overeducated workers are 
distinct groups in regard to the skills they possess, one would expect the wage premium 
of the overeducated workers to be driven by the genuine overeducated subset. Since 
apparently overeducated workers have lower skills than those corresponding to their 
educational level, they would not be expected to receive a premium for those skills. In 
other words, as apparently overeducated workers do a job which is commensurate with 
their skills they are expected to receive a similar wage to that of their adequately 
matched co-workers (AO=0). On the other hand, genuine overeducated workers show a 
higher level of skills than their properly matched colleagues so, if these higher skills are 
rewarded, genuine overeducated workers would be expected to receive higher wages 
(RO>0). 
 
3. Database and variables 
Data used in this study come from the Programme for the International Assessment of 
Adult Competencies (PIAAC), a new survey developed by the OECD which provides 
information about adults aged 16 to 65. One module provides information on cognitive 
skills, which were evaluated through standardized tests on a scale from 0 to 500 points
4
. 
In addition, a background questionnaire offers information about the demographic 
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 PIAAC assesses three domains of cognitive skills: literacy, numeracy, and problem solving in 
technology-rich environments. However, in the case of Spain, only the two first skills were evaluated. 
characteristics, education, social background, income or employment status of the 
individuals.   
In the Spanish case, the sample selection was conducted by the Spanish National 
Institute of Statistics. In this study, this sample is restricted to workers with a level of 
higher education (ISCED 5-6). In addition, only salaried employees are considered and 
the maximum wage has been limited to 200 euros per hour (including bonuses) to avoid 
outliers that could distort the estimates. Observations for which information is not 
available to define the educational mismatch variables are also dropped from the 
analysis. As result, the final sample used in the estimations contains 913 observations. 
All the estimated specifications take as dependent variable the natural logarithm of the 
hourly wage (including bonuses) as declared by workers in the background 
questionnaire. As independent variables, we introduce some variables related to 
education (years of attained education or years of required education) and years of work 
experience (and its square), as well as other personal characteristics variables, like 
gender and nationality, and some labor status related variables (e.g. firm size, 
supervisory tasks, ownership sector)
5
.  
Table 1 offers the descriptive statistics of these variables. The hourly wage ranges from 
2.06 to 107.87 euros, being the average hourly wage 14.26. As only individuals with 
higher education are considered, the minimum years of attained education are 14 and 
the maximum rise to 21, with a mean of 15.63. Average years of required education are 
lower and stand at 14.14, thus pointing to some individuals being overeducated; in fact, 
the minimum years of required education is 6. Average years of experience stand at 
15.64. Males represent 46% of the sample and 92% of the individuals were born in 
Spain. In regard to the labor status variables, most employees work in small or medium 
firms (57% and 24%, respectively), 36% carry out supervisory tasks and 40% work in 
the public sector. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean s.d. min max 
Hourly wage 14.27 9.18 2.06 107.87 
Years of attained schooling  15.63 1.50 14 21 
Years of required schooling 14.14 3.00 6 21 
Experience (years) 16.25 9.87 0 48 
                                                          
5
 A detailed description of variables used in this study is provided in the Appendix. 
Experience
 
square 361.52 389.67 0 2,304 
Male 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Female 0.54 0.50 0 1 
Spanish 0.91 0.29 0 1 
Immigrant 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Small firm 0.58 0.49 0 1 
Medium firm 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Large firm 0.19 0.36 0 1 
Supervisor 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Public sector 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Source: own elaboration using PIAAC data. Descriptive statistics calculated for 913 observations and using sampling 
weights.  
 
As only individuals with a level of higher education are considered, educational 
mismatch in this study refers to overeducation, so workers in the sample will be either 
adequately educated or overeducated. The three traditional methods proposed in the 
literature to measure educational mismatch (i.e. objective, subjective, and statistical 
methods) are used in order to check the robustness of the results
6
. To apply the 
objective method we based on information provided by the International Labor 
Organization, which allows one to establish a match between educational levels and 
occupational groups according to the International Standard Classification of Education 
(ISCED) and to the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO). 
Individuals with higher education (ISCED 5-6) would be expected to be in skilled 
occupations if they were adequately educated for their job (ISCO 1-3), while those in 
semi-skilled occupations (ISCO 4-8) are classified as overeducated. The subjective 
method is applied in an indirect way by comparing the years of education attained by an 
individual (yrsqual in the PIAAC database) with the years he/she declared as required to 
get the job (yrsget in the PIAAC database); individuals are classified as adequately 
educated (overeducated) if years of attained education are equal to (greater than) years 
required to get their job. Finally, the statistical method is used by considering the 
average years of education for each occupational group as a measure of realized 
matched, so workers in the range within plus and minus one standard deviation from the 
mean are considered as adequately educated whereas those with more years of 
education than one standard deviation above the mean, for their specific occupation, are 
classified as overeducated. 
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 See Hartog (2000) for an extensive review and discussion on the different methods generally used in the 
literature to measure educational mismatch. 
Once the variables of educational mismatch are defined, a distinction is made between 
real and apparently overeducated workers according to their level of skills. If 
overeducated workers are heterogeneous in skills, we could think of some overeducated 
workers as having a lower level of skills than that corresponding to their educational 
level or, alternatively, as having a level of skills that match the requirements of the 
undergraduate job they hold; these overeducated workers would be classified as only 
apparently overeducated workers given their level of cognitive skills. Otherwise, if 
overeducated workers show a similar level of skills than other graduates who are well-
matched in a qualified occupation or, alternatively, a level of skills that exceed the 
requirements of their undergraduate job, they will be classified as real or genuine 
overeducated workers.  
 Skilled graduates Low-skilled graduates 
Skilled jobs 
(Graduate skills requirements) 
Matched  
Semi-skilled jobs 
(Undergraduate skills requirements) 
Real overeducation Apparent overeducation 
 
In order to define the variables of real and apparent overeducation, two benchmarks can 
therefore be considered: the level of skills achieved by graduate workers who are well-
matched, and the skill level corresponding to the undergraduate job held by 
overeducated individuals. The next section analyzes the effects of overeducation on 
wages taking account of skill heterogeneity under these two perspectives. 
 
4. Effects of (real and apparent) overeducation on wages 
4.1. The individual’s educational level perspective  
When the individual’s viewpoint is adopted, the level of skills of overeducated workers 
is compared with that corresponding to their educational level as proxied by the level of 
skills acquired by other graduate workers who are well-matched for their job. 
Overeducated workers will then be classified as being real or genuinely overeducated 
when they have a similar level of skills than their well-matched graduate peers, but hold 
a job with lower educational requirements. In order to identify genuine overeducated 
workers we take the mean value of cognitive skills acquired by well-matched graduate 
peers and then compare the skills of overeducated workers with that mean: if the skills 
of overeducated workers are equal to (or greater than) this mean the workers are 
classified as genuinely overeducated; otherwise, those overeducated workers with a 
lower level of skills are classified as being only apparently overeducated. 
This procedure has been applied for each traditional method to measure educational 
mismatch and we have taken the average of the ten plausible values in the domain of 
literacy skills
7
. The distribution of educational mismatch for each measurement method 
is offered in Table 2.  
Table 2. Educational (mis)match and real and apparent overeducation from the 
viewpoint of the individuals’ educational level  
 Objective method Subjective method Statistical method 
Well-matched 64.04% 56.81% 82.42% 
Overeducated 35.96% 43.19% 17.58% 
Real overeducated 12.44% 20.42% 10.53% 
Apparent overeducated 23.52% 22.77% 7.06% 
Source: Own elaboration using PIAAC data.  
It is observed that most of the graduate workers are properly educated for the job they 
do, although the percentage of overeducated workers is quite important and ranges from 
18% (statistical method) to 43% (subjective method). Among the overeducated workers, 
it stands out that around half of the graduate workers who hold a job with lower 
qualification requirements do in fact show a lower level of cognitive skills than that 
corresponding to their educational level and are therefore classified as being only 
apparently overeducated (apparent overeducation reaches between 40% -statistical 
method- and 65% -objective method- of overeducated workers). 
In order to check whether this heterogeneity in skills among overeducated workers 
translates into different effects on wages, various specifications of equations (1) and (2) 
are estimated. Both equations control for attained education, so overeducated workers 
are compared with other graduate peers who are adequately educated for the job they 
do. Table 3 provides the estimation results for each method of measurement of 
educational mismatch
8
. In each case, the first column corresponds to equation (1), 
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 We also replicated the analysis using numeracy skills. Since literacy and numeracy skills in our sample 
show a high correlation (0.9381), the obtained results do not change when using one or the other skill 
domain. Results using the numeracy skill are available upon request. 
8 The Heckman’s methodology (Heckman 1979) is used in all estimates to control for possible sample 
selection bias that could appear as result of wages being observed only for employees. Furthermore, since 
the PIAAC sample bases on a multistage stratified design, all estimates used the Jackknife2 procedure 
and sample weights to overcome potential sampling errors. 
where traditional measures of overeducation are used, and the second column refers to 
equation (2), where the overeducation variable is decomposed into real and apparent 
overeducation. 
First we comment on the estimates when the traditional measures of overeducation are 
used without taking account of skills heterogeneity. The results obtained are consistent 
with those previously found in the literature. The returns to each additional year of 
attained schooling vary between 5% (objective method) and 8% (subjective and 
statistical methods), whereas overeducated workers suffer a wage penalty (estimated in 
the range between 15% and 23%) as compared with their graduate peers who are 
properly matched. In regard to the control variables, the results are also in accordance 
with those generally found in the literature (e.g. positive but decreasing effects of 
experience, and positive wage premiums for men, workers in larger firms, those with 
supervisory tasks and those working in the public sector), so we do not go here into 
details. 
The estimates for the control variables (including years of schooling) do not change in a 
significant way when skills heterogeneity is taken into account via the real and apparent 
overeducation variables. In this case, a wage penalty for both real and apparent 
overeducation is found, although it is noteworthy that the wage penalty for apparently 
overeducated doubles (or more) that of real overeducated workers
9
. When the objective 
method is considered, the wage penalty for apparently overeducated workers reaches 
29% (against 14% for real overeducated individuals) as compared with their well-
matched graduated peers. Similar results are found with the subjective method, with an 
estimated wage penalty of 21% for apparent overeducation against the 9% estimated for 
real overeducation. Last, the statistical method also support these estimated differences, 
with a non-significant wage penalty in the case of real overeducation and a pay penalty 
close to 32% for apparently overeducated workers. In sum, these estimates suggest that 
the effects of real overeducation on wages would be overestimated if one assumes skills 
homogeneity among overeducated workers.  
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 In all cases, the results from the Wald test show that the null hypothesis of equal coefficients between 
real and apparent overeducation is rejected at the 5% significance level. 
Table 3. Effects of overeducation on wages (viewpoint of the individuals’ educational 
level) 
 Objective method Subjective method Statistical method 
Overeducation -0.232*** 
 
-0.152*** 
 
-0.153*** 
 
 
(0.0356) 
 
(0.0301) 
 
(0.0556) 
 
Real  
overeducation 
 
-0.141*** 
 
-0.0942*** 
 
-0.0328 
 
(0.0470) 
 
(0.0364) 
 
(0.0629) 
Apparent 
overeducation 
 
-0.292*** 
 
-0.211*** 
 
-0.318*** 
 
(0.0427) 
 
(0.0398) 
 
(0.0559) 
Years of (attained) 
schooling 
0.0518*** 0.0505*** 0.0786*** 0.0761*** 0.0827*** 0.0806*** 
(0.00885) (0.00876) (0.00972) (0.00951) (0.0121) (0.0122) 
Experience 0.0341*** 0.0357*** 0.0178* 0.0206** 0.00971 0.0127 
 
(0.00974) (0.00964) (0.00920) (0.00959) (0.0100) (0.0101) 
Experience
2 -0.000573** -0.0006*** -0.000212 -0.000265 -1.75e-05 -8.12e-05 
 
(0.000231) (0.000229) (0.000228) (0.000236) (0.000250) (0.000251) 
Male 0.119*** 0.115*** 0.113*** 0.108*** 0.113*** 0.107*** 
 
(0.0266) (0.0267) (0.0280) (0.0286) (0.0305) (0.0299) 
Immigrant -0.0690 -0.0581 -0.0681 -0.0558 -0.0968 -0.0894 
 
(0.0707) (0.0697) (0.0782) (0.0778) (0.0759) (0.0750) 
Medium firm 0.110*** 0.107*** 0.116*** 0.113*** 0.0887** 0.0956*** 
 
(0.0315) (0.0313) (0.0394) (0.0386) (0.0365) (0.0362) 
Large firm 0.154*** 0.158*** 0.163*** 0.164*** 0.160*** 0.163*** 
 
(0.0446) (0.0452) (0.0465) (0.0460) (0.0459) (0.0455) 
Supervisor 0.191*** 0.189*** 0.198*** 0.200*** 0.219*** 0.220*** 
 
(0.0281) (0.0274) (0.0300) (0.0301) (0.0308) (0.0301) 
Public sector 0.129*** 0.125*** 0.152*** 0.151*** 0.176*** 0.175*** 
 
(0.0360) (0.0354) (0.0348) (0.0345) (0.0345) (0.0335) 
Lambda -0.0994 -0.0620 -0.469** -0.400** -0.626*** -0.561*** 
 
(0.232) (0.226) (0.194) (0.202) (0.193) (0.194) 
Constant 1.205*** 1.198*** 0.972*** 0.967*** 0.965*** 0.947*** 
 
(0.234) (0.229) (0.236) (0.236) (0.265) (0.272) 
Regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Obs. 876 876 852 852 836 836 
R-squared 0.400 0.406 0.417 0.422 0.399 0.411 
Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: PIAAC database. Jackknife2 procedure and PIAAC’s sampling weights used in all estimations. 
 
4.2. The job’s requirements perspective 
The second perspective to distinguish between real and apparent overeducation 
according to the level of skills takes as reference the requirements of the job. Under this 
view, the skills of the overeducated individuals are compared with those of workers 
who do a similar job but who are properly educated (i.e. well-matched workers in a 
similar job). Overeducated workers are then classified as being only apparently 
overeducated if, despite having higher qualifications, they have a similar level of skills 
than their well-matched co-workers. In order to identify apparently overeducated 
workers we take the mean value of skills acquired by (undergraduate) well-matched 
workers in each occupation and then compare the skills of overeducated workers with 
that mean: if the skills of overeducated workers are equal to (or lower than) this mean 
the workers are classified as being apparently overeducated; conversely, if overeducated 
workers show a higher level of skills they are classified as suffering from genuine or 
real overeducation. 
Again, we apply this procedure for each measurement method of educational mismatch 
and take the average of the ten plausible values of literacy skills. Table 4 offers the 
distinction between real and apparent overeducation for each measurement method 
under the viewpoint of skills’ job requirements.  
Table 4. Educational (mis)match and real and apparent overeducation from the 
viewpoint of the jobs’ requirements  
 Objective method Subjective method Statistical method 
Well-matched 64.04% 56.81% 82.42% 
Overeducated 35.96% 43.19% 17.58% 
Real overeducated 26.48% 34.04% 14.59% 
Apparent overeducated 9.48% 9.15% 2.99% 
Source: Own elaboration using PIAAC data.  
Since the average skills level of well-matched (undergraduate) workers in semi-skilled 
occupations is lower than that of well-matched graduate workers in skilled occupations, 
the percentage of workers who are classified as being genuinely overeducated is 
logically greater than before. In fact, under this view, around three quarters of the 
overeducated are classified as suffering from genuine overeducation whereas the 
percentage of apparent overeducation only reaches between 17% (statistical method) 
and 26% (objective method) of the graduate workers who hold a job with lower 
educational requirements
10
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 Alternatively, we classified overeducated workers into real and apparently overeducated using the 
interval within one standard deviation from the mean. The percentages of workers classified as real or 
apparently overeducated changed slightly, but the estimated effects on wages are qualitative and 
quantitative similar to those reported here (these estimations are available upon request). Since taking the 
interval within one standard deviation from the mean (or any value between the average of skills of well-
matched graduate workers and that of undergraduates in semiqualified occupations) is a rather arbitrary 
Under the job’s perspective, equations (3) and (4) are estimated. These equations 
control for the required education to get a job, so overeducated workers are compared 
with their well-matched (undergraduate) co-workers in each occupation. Table 5 
provides the estimates of the effects of overeducation on wages. As before, the first 
column offers the estimates using the traditional measures of overeducation (equation 3) 
whereas in the second column the real and apparent overeducation variables are 
introduced (equation 4). 
Again, the obtained results are in line with those found in the existing literature when 
skills heterogeneity is not considered. In this case, a wage premium is found for 
overeducated workers as compared with their well-matched colleagues. Since workers 
are compared within a similar job, this wage premium for overeducated workers comes 
from the higher human capital (proxied by education) of graduate workers. In particular, 
the wage premium estimated for graduate individuals working in occupations with 
lower educational requirements stands between 7% (objective method) and 19% 
(statistical method). 
The results change significantly when variables of real and apparent overeducation are 
introduced. For all methods of educational mismatch measurement, it is observed that 
the wage premium for genuine overeducated workers is higher than that estimated for 
overeducated workers when skill heterogeneity is not taken into account, whereas 
workers with only apparent overeducation do not receive any significant premium. In 
particular, the wage premium for real overeducation is estimated between 9% (objective 
method) and 21% (statistical method). On the other hand, no wage premium is found for 
graduate overeducated workers showing a level of skills according to the (lower) 
requirements of their job, thus suggesting that a higher level of education does not 
translate into higher wages if it is not accompanied by the acquisition of the cognitive 
skills which would correspond to that educational level. 
Table 5. Effects of overeducation on wages (viewpoint of the job’s requirements) 
 Objective method Subjective method Statistical method 
Overeducation 0.0719* 
 
0.127*** 
 
0.188*** 
 
 
(0.0374) 
 
(0.0345) 
 
(0.0567) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
choice, we decided to use the mean value as benchmark so the classification between real and apparent 
overeducation under the individuals’ and jobs’ perspectives will offer an idea of the lower and upper 
values of the distribution between real and apparent overeducation. 
Real 
 overeducation 
 
0.0895** 
 
0.160*** 
 
0.209*** 
 
(0.0410) 
 
(0.0356) 
 
(0.0601) 
Apparent 
overeducation 
 
0.0204 
 
0.0239 
 
0.0959 
 
(0.0603) 
 
(0.0586) 
 
(0.0839) 
Years of (required) 
schooling 
0.0407*** 0.0408*** 0.0476*** 0.0461*** 0.0414*** 0.0414*** 
(0.00515) (0.00514) (0.00708) (0.00706) (0.00528) (0.00526) 
Experience 0.0110 0.0112 0.00877 0.00892 0.0128** 0.0131** 
 
(0.00756) (0.00760) (0.00693) (0.00689) (0.00648) (0.00648) 
Experience
2 -0.000118 -0.000120 -0.000107 -0.000101 -0.000152 -0.000155 
 
(0.000168) (0.000169) (0.000158) (0.000157) (0.000138) (0.000138) 
Male 0.153*** 0.152*** 0.153*** 0.147*** 0.101*** 0.0984*** 
 
(0.0275) (0.0278) (0.0344) (0.0348) (0.0289) (0.0295) 
Immigrant -0.0915** -0.0857* -0.000619 0.0171 -0.0897** -0.0869** 
 
(0.0428) (0.0442) (0.0637) (0.0641) (0.0417) (0.0419) 
Medium firm 0.133*** 0.134*** 0.160*** 0.160*** 0.147*** 0.147*** 
 
(0.0295) (0.0296) (0.0444) (0.0438) (0.0418) (0.0422) 
Large firm 0.248*** 0.247*** 0.164*** 0.164*** 0.241*** 0.241*** 
 
(0.0440) (0.0437) (0.0395) (0.0400) (0.0586) (0.0584) 
Supervisor 0.137*** 0.137*** 0.235*** 0.236*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 
 
(0.0345) (0.0344) (0.0369) (0.0370) (0.0361) (0.0361) 
Public sector 0.202*** 0.197*** 0.202*** 0.199*** 0.167*** 0.165*** 
 
(0.0372) (0.0369) (0.0336) (0.0335) (0.0395) (0.0396) 
Lambda 0.103 0.105 -0.257** -0.237* -0.0181 -0.0127 
 
(0.169) (0.169) (0.128) (0.124) (0.123) (0.124) 
Constant 1.201*** 1.197*** 1.300*** 1.305*** 1.293*** 1.288*** 
 
(0.150) (0.151) (0.158) (0.157) (0.121) (0.120) 
Regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Obs. 1,001 1,001 747 747 906 906 
R-squared 0.343 0.344 0.404 0.410 0.409 0.410 
Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: PIAAC database. Jackknife2 procedure and PIAAC’s sampling weights used in all estimations. 
 
5. Discussion and concluding remarks 
In this work, the assumption of homogeneous skills among individuals with a similar 
level of education has been relaxed. Over the last decade, some researchers have 
suggested new ways to measure educational mismatch with the aim to consider the 
existence of heterogeneous workers, being the self-declared satisfaction by the 
individuals in regard to their education-job match, as proposed by Chevalier (2003), or 
the individuals’ perceptions about their (mis)match in skills, as proposed by Green and 
Zhu (2010), two of the most commonly ways used to distinguish between genuine and 
apparently overeducated workers. In this study, we proposed an alternative approach 
based on the level of cognitive skills actually achieved by the individuals with a similar 
level of education. 
We used the PIAAC database, which offers information on the cognitive skills of the 
individuals, and applied this proposal to the study of the wage effects of overeducation 
in the Spanish labor market by taking account of skills heterogeneity among individuals 
with a higher education degree. The obtained results are consistent with the conceptual 
framework and are robust to the use of different measures of educational mismatch. 
Moreover, two perspectives have been adopted to differentiate between real and 
apparent overeducation and to analyze the effects of (real and apparent) overeducation 
on wages: the first one adopting the viewpoint of the individual’s educational 
attainment, and the second one under the perspective of the job’s requirements. 
Under the individual’s educational level perspective, the skills acquired by the 
overeducated workers are compared with those of their peers who, with the same level 
of education, are well-matched for the job they do. Overeducated individuals are then 
classified as suffering real or genuine overeducation if they show a similar level of 
skills than their well-matched graduate peers, whereas those who have a lower level of 
skills than what corresponds to their educational degree are classified as being only 
apparently overeducated. Under this perspective, it is found that around half of the 
overeducated workers with a higher degree in the Spanish labor market could in fact be 
classified as only being apparently overeducated. Beyond the distinction between real 
and apparent overeducation, we analyzed the wage penalties associated with each group 
of overeducated workers in order to test whether this heterogeneity in skills translates 
into different returns to education. Both real and apparently overeducated workers suffer 
a wage penalty as compared with their well-matched graduate peers. However, the wage 
penalty suffered by real overeducated workers is lower than that of apparent 
overeducation. Since genuine overeducated workers have a similar level of skills than 
their well-matched peers, their wage penalty does not come from their lower human 
capital (as proxied either by their educational level or by their cognitive skills) but from 
the lower requirements of the job they hold, what can prevent real overeducated workers 
to fully utilize their skills. In the case of apparent overeducation, a greater wage penalty 
is estimated, a result which would respond to both holding a job with lower educational 
requirements and having a lower level of skills than what corresponds to their 
educational level.  
Our results differ from those found in previous studies which differentiate between 
genuine and apparent overeducation, such as those by Chevalier (2003), Green and Zhu 
(2010) or Pecoraro (2014). In these studies, the wage penalty found for genuine 
overeducation is greater than that suffered by apparently overeducated workers. This is 
not in conflict with our results, however, since it arises from the different ways adopted 
to define real and apparent overeducation. Following Chevalier (2003), genuine 
overeducated workers are those who, in addition to be overeducated, are not satisfied 
with the match between their education and the job they hold; it would then be expected 
that these workers suffer a double pay penalty for, on the one hand, holding a job with 
lower educational requirements and, on the other, for being dissatisfied with their 
education-job match. Similarly, Green and Zhu (2010) and Pecoraro (2014) consider 
those overeducated workers who also declare to suffer an excess of skills as being 
genuine overeducated, hence the greater wage penalty they suffer since they are 
mismatched in both education and skills. These results support the hypothesis of 
heterogeneous workers among the overeducated, but the distinction of real and apparent 
overeducation based on individuals’ perceptions of skill mismatch (or based on the 
satisfaction with the education-job match) does not allow to directly assess the 
hypothesis of skills heterogeneity among individuals with a similar level of education. 
Both Chevalier (2003) and Green and Zhu (2010) find that most of the individuals 
classified as genuine overeducated according to their definitions do indeed hold jobs 
with very low requirements, so it could be that this heterogeneity in occupations, and 
not in skills, gives rise to the greater wage penalties observed for genuine overeducated 
workers. In fact, overeducated individuals with a lower level of skills than that 
corresponding to their educational level could be classified, according to these 
definitions, as being genuine overeducated if they hold a very low-level job. According 
to the proposal of this study, these workers would be however classified as being only 
apparently overeducated since they do not have the skills corresponding to their 
educational level and, consequently, they do not fit the requirements of a graduate job. 
The differences in the obtained results are therefore not in conflict, but come from the 
different views adopted to define real and apparent overeducation. 
Our approach directly assesses the hypothesis of skills heterogeneity and also allows 
one to take account of heterogeneity in occupations when the job’s requirement 
perspective is adopted. Under this view, the skills achieved by overeducated workers are 
compared with those of their well-matched co-workers within each occupation, so 
overeducated workers are classified as being only apparently overeducated if, despite 
their higher educational level, they have a similar level of skills as their well-matched 
colleagues in each occupation. When the comparison is made within a similar job, it is 
found that the wage premium get by overeducated workers as compared with their 
adequately educated co-workers comes from the higher human capital, as measured by 
the level of cognitive skills, of the subset of genuine overeducated workers. Apparent 
overeducated workers, on the contrary, do not receive any significant wage premium in 
spite of their higher level of education since their skills are commensurate with the job 
they do.  This result suggests that holding a higher degree does not translate into higher 
wages if not accompanied by the acquisition of the corresponding cognitive skills. 
The data used in this study prevent us to explore the causes of skills heterogeneity 
among graduate workers (e.g. innate abilities, motivation, schooling quality, socio-
economic background, etc.), but evidence the need to take the cognitive skills actually 
acquired by overeducated individuals into account when analyzing the wage effects of 
overeducation. The distinction between real and apparent overeducation according to 
the level of cognitive skills achieved by the overeducated workers allows us to 
disentangle the mechanisms behind the lower pay of overeducated workers as compared 
with their well-matched graduated peers (or alternatively the wage premium received as 
compared with their adequately educated co-workers) and suggests that the wage effects 
of overeducation would be overestimated if homogeneous skills were considered. 
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Appendix  
Table A.1. Variables definition 
Variable Definition 
Wage Natural logarithm of hourly wage (including bonuses) 
Obtained from earnhrbonus 
Overeducation Dummy if the individual is overeducated 
0 = adequately educated (well-matched) 
1 = overeducated 
Real overeducation Dummy if the individual is really overeducated 
0 = other 
1 = really overeducated 
Apparent overeducation Dummy if the individual is apparently overeducated  
0 = other 
1 = apparently overeducated 
Years of attained schooling Years of attained schooling 
Obtained from yrsqual 
Years of required schooling Years of required schooling to get a job 
Obtained from yrsget 
Experience Years in a paid job 
Obtained from c_q09 
Gender Dummy for individuals’ gender 
0 = female 
1 = male 
Obtained from gender_r 
Nationality Dummy for nationality 
0 = Spanish 
1 = immigrant 
Obtained from j_q04a 
Firm size Dummies for firm size 
Small: between 1and 50 workers (reference variable) 
Medium: between 51 and 250 workers 
Large: more than 251 workers 
Obtained from d_q06a 
Supervisor Dummy if the individual does supervisory tasks 
0 = no supervisor 
1 = supervisor 
Obtained from d_q08a 
Sector Dummy if the individual works in the public sector 
0 = other 
1 = public sector 
Obtained from d_q0 
Regions Dummy for each region (17 Autonomous Communities) 
 
